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Abstract
The Geneva–Brussels approach to quantum mechanics (QM) and the
semantic realism (SR) nonstandard interpretation of QM exhibit some
common features and some deep conceptual differences. We discuss in
this paper two elementary models provided in the two approaches as
intuitive supports to general reasonings and as a proof of consistency
of general assumptions, and show that Aerts’ quantum machine can
be embodied into a macroscopic version of the microscopic SR model,
overcoming the seeming incompatibility between the two models. This
result provides some hints for the construction of a unified perspective
in which the two approaches can be properly placed.
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1 Introduction
The Geneva–Brussels (GB) approach to quantum mechanics (QM) is well
known. It was started by Jauch and Piron in Geneva [19], [23] and then con-
tinued by Aerts and his collaborators in Brussels [1]–[9]. It can be classified
in the field of “quantum structures research” [7], aiming both at basing QM
on fundamental concepts that can be operationally defined and at provid-
ing a physical justification of the relations established by QM among these
concepts. In its latest version it also proposes, however, some fundamental
changes of the standard theory in order to avoid a number of quantum prob-
lems and paradoxes and overcome the limits of the QM description of the
physical world (with special attention to compound quantum systems).
The GB approach exhibits two relevant features. Firstly, quantum proba-
bilities are interpreted as epistemic (they express our ignorance about hidden
measurements rather than about hidden states of the physical system), at
variance with the standard interpretation, where quantum probabilities are
(mostly) ontologic. Secondly, the mathematical structure of the set of empir-
ical propositions called quantum logic (QL) is interpreted as a consequence
of our “possibilities of active experimenting” on physical systems, not as a
new logic formalizing some “process of our reflection”, so that QL does not
characterize the microscopic world (indeed, when our possibilities of active
experimenting on a macroscopic entity are suitably limited, one can find
quantum logical structures associated with this entity).
The above features also appear within the semantic realism (SR) inter-
pretation of QM propounded by the Lecce research group on the foundations
of QM as an alternative to the standard interpretation [11]–[15], aiming to
avoid the same problems and paradoxes considered by the GB approach.
Moreover, the SR interpretation also implies that a broader theory embody-
ing QM is, at least in principle, possible. This suggests that a comparison
between the two perspectives could be interesting, and that an attempt at
extablishing links between them could be fruitful. Yet, whenever one starts
this job, one immediately meets a serious difficulty. Indeed, the GB approach
is highly contextual, following in this sense the standard QM tradition. On
the contrary, the SR interpretation mantains that contextuality is the root
of most quantum paradoxes and elaborates a strategy (based on some episte-
mological criticisms to the standard interpretation) to avoid it without con-
flicting with the mathematical apparatus and the predictions of QM. Thus
the two approaches seem conceptually incompatible at first sight. However,
a deeper insight shows that this is not necessarily the case. We cannot yet
prove this by providing a general perspective in which both approaches find
a proper place, but we can show that an integration is possible in the case of
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the models introduced in the GB and SR approaches as intuitive supports to
general reasonings (and also as a demonstration of consistency of some ab-
stract assumptions, especially within the SR interpretation). To be precise,
we intend to show in the present paper that a macroscopic version of the in-
tuitive picture for the SR model provided in some previous papers [16], [17]
(briefly, microscopic SR model in the following) can be constructed which
embodies Aerts’ quantum machine (which plays an important role in Aerts’
approach since it provides a macroscopic model for spin measurements on
spin–1
2
quantum systems). This unified (SR) model provides the same pre-
dictions as Aerts’ quantum machine whenever one takes into account those
and only those samples of the physical system under investigation that are
actually detected if a measurement is performed. In this sense we can say
that the two models are formally equivalent (the equivalence is attained,
however, by means of a rather artificial and complicate construction, which
does not aim to represent any physical reality but only to illustrate a logical
possibility).
It must still be stressed that our unified model applies to quantum systems
described by two dimensional Hilbert spaces, just as the quantum machine.
The GB approach provides, however, more general models which apply to
higher dimensional quantum cases. Embodying these models within a gen-
eralized unified (SR) model seems possible in principle (the microscopic SR
model makes no reference to the dimensionality of the Hilbert space of the
system) but it may raise some problems. In particular, it could be difficult in
this case to reconciliate the contextuality of the GB models with the noncon-
textuality of the SR model. We do not discuss this problem in the present
paper and limit ourselves to note that the remarks in Sec. 4.1 on the different
notions of contextuality introduced in the literature may help in solving it.
Finally, let us briefly resume the content of the various sections of our
paper. Firstly, we sketch the guidelines of the microscopic SR model and
quantum machine in Secs. 2 and 3, respectively. This leads us, in particular,
to complete the microscopic SR model by means of some equations which
do not appear in the original draft. Then, our unified model is introduced
in Sec. 4, it is discussed in the case of pure states in Sec. 4.1, and it is
generalized to the case of mixed states in Sec. 4.2.
2 The microscopic SR model
As we have anticipated in the Introduction, the consistency of the SR ap-
proach has recently been demonstrated by means of a set–theoretical model,
the microscopic SR model, that shows, circumventing known no–go theorems,
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how a local and noncontextual (hence objective) picture of the microworld
can be constructed without altering the formalism and the (statistical) in-
terpretation of QM. We report the essentials of it here.
To begin with, let us accept the standard notion of state of a physical
system Ω as a class of physically equivalent preparing devices [21]. Further-
more, let us call physical object any individual sample x of Ω obtained by
activating a preparing device, and say that x is in the state S if the device
π preparing x belongs to S. Whenever Ω is a microscopic physical system,
let us introduce a set E of microscopic physical properties that characterize
Ω and play the role of theoretical entities. For every physical object x, ev-
ery property f ∈ E is associated with x in a dichotomic way, so that one
briefly says that every f ∈ E either is possessed or it is not possessed by x.
This is the main difference between the SR interpretation and the ortodox
interpretation of QM, in which it is assumed that microphysical objects gen-
erally do not possess a property until it is measured [22]. The set F0 of all
macroscopic properties is then introduced as in standard QM, that is, it is
defined as the set of all pairs of the form (A0,∆), where A0 is an observ-
able (that is, a class of physically equivalent measuring apparatuses) with
spectrum Λ0, and ∆ a Borel set on the real line ℜ (for every observable A0,
different Borel sets containing the same subset of Λ0 obviously define physi-
cally equivalent properties; we note explicitly that, whenever we speak about
macroscopic properties in the following, we actually understand such classes
of physically equivalent macroscopic properties). Yet, every observable A0
is obtained from a suitable observable A of standard QM by adding to the
spectrum Λ of A a further outcome a0 that does not belong to Λ, called
the no–registration outcome of A0 (note that such an outcome is introduced
also within the standard quantum theory of measurement, but it plays here
a different theoretical role), so that Λ0 = Λ ∪ {a0}. The set E of all micro-
scopic properties is then assumed to be in one–to–one correspondence with
the subset F ⊆ F0 of all macroscopic properties of the form F = (A0,∆),
where A0 is an observable and a0 /∈ ∆.
Basing on the above definitions and assumptions, one can provide the
following description of the measurement process. Whenever a physical ob-
ject x is prepared in a state S by a given device π, and A0 is measured by
means of a suitable apparatus, the set of microscopic properties possessed by
x produces a probability (which is either 0 or 1 if the model is deterministic)
that the apparatus does not react, so that the outcome a0 may be obtained.
In this case, x is not detected and one cannot get any explicit information
about the microscopic physical properties possessed by x. If, on the contrary,
the apparatus reacts, an outcome different from a0, say a, is obtained, and
one is informed that x possesses all microscopic properties associated with
4
macroscopic properties of the form F = (A0,∆), where ∆ is a Borel set such
that a0 /∈ ∆ and a ∈ ∆ (for the sake of brevity we also say that x possesses
all macroscopic properties as F in this case).
In order to place properly quantum probability within the above picture,
let us consider a preparing device π ∈ S that is activated repeatedly. In this
case a (finite) set S of physical objects in the state S is prepared. Then,
let us partition S into subsets S 1, S 2, ..., S n, such that in each subset all
objects possess the same microscopic properties (we can briefly say that the
objects in S i, possessing the same microscopic properties, are in the same
microstate Si), and assume that a measurement of an observable A0 is done
on every object. Finally, let us introduce the following symbols (see Fig. 1).
S
1 . . . S i . . . S j . . . S n
(g, f, h, ..)1 . . . (g, f,¬h..)i . . . (g,¬f, h, ..)j . . . (¬g,¬f, h, ..)n
N1 . . . N i . . . N j . . . Nn
N1F = N
i
F = N
j
F = 0 N
n
F = 0
N1 −N10 N
i −N i0
N10 N
i
0 N
j
0 N
n
0
Fig. 1. Set–theoretical representation of the general SR model. The property
F is the macroscopic property corresponding to the microscopic property f .
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(i) The number N of physical objects in S .
(ii) The number N0 of physical objects in S that are not detected.
(iii) The number N i of physical objects in S i.
(iv) The number N i0 of physical objects in S
i that are not detected.
(v) The number N iF of physical objects in S
i that possess the macro-
scopic property F = (A0,∆), with a0 /∈ ∆, corresponding to the microscopic
property f .
It is apparent that the number N iF either coincides with N
i−N i0 or with
0. The former case occurs whenever f is possessed by the objects in S i,
since all objects that are detected then yield outcome in ∆. The latter case
occurs whenever f is not possessed by the objects in S i, since all objects
that are detected then yield outcome different from a0 but outside ∆ (note
that the microscopic property ¬f corresponding to F⊥ = (A0,ℜ\(∆∪{a0}))
is possessed by the objects in S i in this case). In both cases one can assume
that N i −N i0 6= 0
1, so that the following equation holds.
N iF
N i
=
N i −N i0
N i
N iF
N i −N i0
. (1)
The term on the left in eq. (1) represents the fraction of objects possessing
the property F in S i, the first term on the right the fraction of objects in S i
that are detected, the second term (which is either 0 or 1) indicates whether
the objects in S i that are detected possess the property F or not.
The fraction of objects in S that possess the property F is given by
1
N
∑
i
N iF =
N −N0
N
(∑
i
N iF
N −N0
)
. (2)
Let us assume now that all fractions of objects converge in the large number
limit, so that they can be substituted by probabilities, and that these prob-
abilities do not depend on the choice of the preparing device π in S. Hence,
if one considers the large number limit of eq. (1), one gets
P
i,t
S (F ) = P
i,d
S (F )P
i
S(F ), (3)
where P i,tS (F ) is the total probability that a physical object x which pos-
sesses the microscopic properties that characterize S i, i.e., which is in the
state Si, also possesses the property F , P i,dS (F ) is the probability that x is
1Note that in a deterministic model either N i
0
= 0 or N i
0
= N i, hence either N i−N i
0
=
N
i or N i − N i
0
= 0, so that the assumption N i − N i
0
6= 0 does not hold. However,
N
i −N i
0
= 0 implies N i
F
= 0, and eq. (4) can be recovered by modifying our reasonings
in an obvious way.
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detected when F is measured on it, P iS(F ) (which is either 0 or 1) is the
probability that x possesses the property F when detected. Analogously, the
large number limit of eq. (2) yields
P
t
S(F ) = P
d
S(F )PS(F ), (4)
where P tS(F ) is the total probability that a physical object x in a state S
possesses the property F , PdS(F ) is the probability that x is detected when
F is measured on it, PS(F ) is the probability that x possesses the property
F when detected.
If we identify the previous probabilities with the corresponding fractions
of objects in the large number limit, it is possible to express the macroscopic
probabilities in eq. (4) in terms of the microscopic probabilities in eq. (3).
Indeed,
P
d
S(F ) =
N −N0
N
=
1
N
∑
i
(N i −N i0) =
∑
i
(N i
N
N i −N i0
N i
)
=
=
∑
i
P(Si|S)P i,dS (F ), (5)
where we have identified the fraction of objects in the microstate Si with
respect to the objects in the state S with the conditional probability P(Si|S)
that an object x in the state S actually is in the microstate Si. Analogously,
we get
P
t
S(F ) =
1
N
∑
i
N iF =
∑
i
(N i
N
N i −N i0
N i
N iF
N i −N i0
)
=
=
∑
i
P(Si|S)P i,dS (F )P
i
S(F ). (6)
The interpretation of PS(F ) makes it reasonable to identify this prob-
ability with the quantum probability that a physical object in the state S
possesses the property F . Hence, standard QM can be recovered within the
model as the theory that allows one to evaluate PS(F ) (and its evolution
in time) for every system Ω, state S, and property F = (A0,∆) such that
a0 /∈ ∆. In this perspective, no change of the formalism and the statistical
interpretation of standard QM is required. In particular, any state S can be
represented, as usual, by means of a trace class operator ρS on a Hilbert space
H associated with Ω and any macroscopic property F that corresponds to
a microscopic property can be represented by means of a projection operator
PF on H , so that PS(F ) = Tr{ρSPF}. Thus, the model provides a picture
of the microworld which embodies standard QM. This picture is objective, in
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the sense that for every physical object x in the state S, every macroscopic
property of the form F = (A0,∆) (where a0 may now belong or not to ∆)
either is possessed or is not possessed by x, and the probability that it is pos-
sessed/not possessed is determined by the microscopic properties possessed
by x, which do not depend on the measuring apparatus (hence microscopic
properties play in the model a role similar to states in objective local theories
[10]).
Objectivity has some relevant consequences. We list here some of them.
(i) The probabilities that appear in the microscopic SR model are epis-
temic, since they can be interpreted as due to a lack of knowledge about
microscopic properties.
(ii) The local and noncontextual picture of the microworld provided by
the microscopic SR model is inconsistent with the Bell and the Bell–Kocken–
Specker theorems. One it can show that it violates an assumption underlying
those theorems, which is usually left implicit. Whenever this assumption is
stated explicitly, it proves to be physically problematical [12], [13], [14], [15],
[17], which makes its violation admissible.
(iii) From the viewpoint of the model, QM is a theory that is incomplete
in several senses (it does not provide the probabilities P tS(F ) and P
d
S(F ) and
it does not say anything about the distribuition of microscopic properties on
physical objects in a given state whenever the objects are not detected). From
this viewpoint, a broader theory embodying QM can be envisaged, according
to which the quantum probability PS(F ) is considered as a conditional rather
than an absolute probability.
(iv) The microscopic properties that appear in the model are hidden pa-
rameters, but are not hidden variables in the standard sense. Indeed, it can
be proved [15], [17], [18] that they are not bound to satisfy in every physical
situation the condition introduced by Kocken and Specker as a basic require-
ment “for the successful introduction of hidden variables” [20], [22]. This
explains why microscopic properties are noncontextual.
(v) The no–registration outcome does not occur because of flaws of the
measuring apparatus, but it is determined by the microscopic properties of
the physical object. Hence, PdS(F ) may be less than 1 also in the case of
ideal apparatuses.
3 The quantum machine
By introducing the entity called quantum machine [3]–[8] one can produce
a macroscopic model for measurements on a quantum system described by
a two–dimensional Hilbert space (e.g., a spin–1
2
quantum particle whenever
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PP
P
P
γ γ
(a)
(d)(c)
(b)
u
v
-u
uu
u
-u
-u
-u
Fig. 2. A three dimensional representation of the quantum machine as
proposed by Aerts.
only spin observables are taken into account), which suggests that quantum
probabilities can be reinterpreted as epistemic rather than ontologic.
The quantum machine consists of a classical point particle bound to stay
on the surface of a spherical ball with radius 1. Hence each pure state of the
machine is represented by a point P of this surface, or, equivalently, by a
position vector ~v belonging to the unitary Aerts sphere. Furthermore, each
possible experiment connected to the quantum machine can be described
as follows. Consider two diametrically opposite points on the Aerts sphere,
briefly identified with the (unitary) position vectors ~u and −~u respectively,
and install an elastic strip of 2 units of length, fixed with one of its end–points
in ~u and the other end–point in −~u (Fig. 2 (a)). Whenever the experiment
is performed, the particle falls from its original place orthogonally onto the
elastic, and sticks to it (Fig. 2 (b)). Then, the elastic breaks at some
arbitrary point. Consequently the particle, attached to one of the two pieces
of the elastic (Fig. 2 (c)), is pulled to one of the two end–points ~u or −~u
(Fig. 2 (d)). Now, depending on whether the particle arrives in ~u or in −~u,
we give the outcome o1 or o2 to the experiment.
Let us now calculate the probabilities of the two outcomes. If we demand
that the elastic, installed between ~u and −~u, can break at any point of
this interval with the same probability, the probability µ(~u,~v, o1) that the
particle ends up in point ~u, so that the experiment gives outcome o1, when
9
P−u
γ
L
L2
1
u
v
Fig. 3. Representation of the experimental process in the plane where it
takes place.
the quantum machine is in the state represented by the vector ~v, is given by
the length of the piece of elastic L1 divided by the total length of the elastic
(Fig. 3). The probability µ(~u,~v, o2) that the particle ends up in point −~u,
so that the experiment gives outcome o2, when the quantum machine is in
the state represented by the vector ~v, is given by the length of the piece of
elastic L2 divided by the total length of the elastic. Thus we get
µ(~u,~v, o1) =
L1
2
=
1 + cos γ
2
= cos2
γ
2
, (7)
µ(~u,~v, o2) =
L2
2
=
1− cos γ
2
= sin2
γ
2
, (8)
where γ is the angle between ~u and ~v.
It is well known that the above probabilities coincide with the probabili-
ties that appear in spin measurements on a spin–1
2
quantum particle. Indeed,
a pure (spin) state of such a particle is represented by the vector
|ψ〉 = cos
θ
2
e−i
φ
2 |+〉+ sin
θ
2
ei
φ
2 |−〉 (9)
which is an eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue +1
2
~ of the self–
adjoint operator A = 1
2
~~σ · ~v, representing the observable spin along the
direction ~v = xˆ sin θ cos φ + yˆ sin θ sinφ + zˆ cos θ. This establishes a corre-
spondence ω between vectors representing pure states of the spin–1
2
quantum
particle and points of the surface of a sphere with radius 1 centered in the
origin of ℜ3 (Bloch sphere representation). This correspondence is one–to–
one (up to a phase factor) and obviously induces a bijective mapping of
the set of states of the spin–1
2
quantum particle on the set of states of the
10
classical point particle considered above. Then, let us consider a measure-
ment of the observable A represented by the operator A = 1
2
~~σ · ~u, with
~u = xˆ sinα cos β+ yˆ sinα sin β+ zˆ cos β, on the spin–1
2
quantum particle in a
state represented by the vector |ψ〉, and let us denote by γ the angle between
the two vectors ~u and ~v = ω(|ψ〉). It is easy to prove that the probabilities
P
A,QM
ψ (+
1
2
~) and PA,QMψ (−
1
2
~) that the measurement yields results +1
2
~
and −1
2
~, respectively, are given by
P
A,QM
ψ (+
1
2
~) = cos2
γ
2
, (10)
P
A,QM
ψ (−
1
2
~) = sin2
γ
2
, (11)
which coincide with the probabilities µ(~u,~v, o1) and µ(~u,~v, o2) in eqs. (7)
and (8), respectively. Hence, our measurement is equivalent to performing
an experiment with the quantum machine in the state represented by the
vector ~v = ω(|ψ〉) and the elastic installed between ~u and −~u. It follows that
the quantum machine provides a macroscopic model for measures of the spin
of a spin–1
2
quantum particle or, more generally, for any quantum system
associated with a two–dimensional complex Hilbert space.
4 A unified model
The models described in the previous sections have different features and
have been constructed with different aims. The microscopic SR model is
a noncontextual general model for measurements on any kind of quantum
system, aiming to demonstrate the consistency of the SR interpretation of
QM. The quantum machine provides a macroscopic model for measurements
on quantum systems described by two dimensional Hilbert spaces, aiming
in particular to suggest some enlargements of QM which would allow us
to go beyond its present limits, which is classified by the authors as highly
contextual [9] (in the sense that the result of a measurement depends also on
the measuring apparatus and not only on the state of the particle that is
measured).
There are however some remarkable analogies between the two models.
Let us point out some of them.
First of all, in both models probabilities are epistemic, which follows from
the adoption of two “nonstandard” hidden variables theories. An measure-
ment on the quantum machine is an example of hidden measurement, in
the sense that probabilities appear because of lack of knowledge about the
specific measurement that is actually performed on the entity (namely, one
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does not know the specific point in which the elastic breaks), not because
of lack of knowledge about states of a quantum object, as in a standard
hidden variables theory. The epistemicity of probabilities in the microscopic
SR model follows instead both from lack of knowledge about the microstates
(as in a standard hidden variables theory) and about the measurement (un-
known probability of the a0 outcome in a microstate); this lack of knowledge
disappears, however, in a deterministic model, see footnote 1). Hence, the
microscopic SR model (which is noncontextual and local) can also be con-
sidered a nonstandard hidden variables theory.
Secondly, both models reproduce quantum probabilities by introducing
suitable conditions. Within the quantum machine model only elastic mea-
surements are permitted. Within the microscopic SR model quantum proba-
bilities follow whenever one considers only objects that are actually detected.
Bearing in mind the above similarities, one may wonder whether a macro-
scopic version of the microscopic SR model can be constructed which embod-
ies Aerts’ quantum machine. At first sight this task seems impossible because
of the opposite features of the two models with respect to contextuality. We
show in the next sections that the problem can be overcome and construct
the desired model.
4.1 Description of the model for pure states
Bearing in mind the microscopic SR model discussed in Sec. 2, we modify
Aerts’ quantum machine as illustrated in Fig. 4. To be precise, let us
suppose that the classical point particle that is in the point P , hence in the
state S represented by the vector ~v according to Aerts’ model, is actually in
one of the points on the surface of the second sphere (detection sphere), which
is identical to Aerts’ sphere and tangent to it in the point P . Let us install
an elastic of 2 units of length in the direction determined by the vector ~v.
Whenever a measurement is performed, the particle falls orthogonally onto
the elastic, then the elastic breaks in some arbitrary point and the particle
ends up in one of the two extremal points of the elastic. If the particle ends
up in the contact point P with Aerts sphere, then we say that the particle
is detected and, in this case, the experimental process can give one of two
outcomes, o1 or o2, with the probabilities predicted by Aerts’ model. On the
contrary, if the particle ends up in the other extreme, we say that it is not
detected and, in this case, the outcome a0 is obtained.
Let us remind that in the microscopic SR model every pure state S of
the physical system can be split into microstates Si, and let us identify these
hidden states in our model with the points on the surface of the detection
sphere. Furthermore, let us note that the macroscopic property F in Sec.
12
γO
u
−u
v
a0
θ0S
Si
θ i
(
O
v)
o
o1
2
Fig. 4. Representation of the detection and the quantum measurement in
the plane where they take place.
2 can be identified now either (i) with the pair (~u, o1), or (ii) with the pair
(~u, o2). The measurements of both properties are performed in the same way,
hence we can assume that the detection probability P i,dS (F ) in eq. (5) does
not depend on o1 and o2 but only on ~u, and write it P
i,d
S (~u) in our particular
case. Therefore the detection probability PdS(F ) will be written P
d
S(~u) in
our case and eq. (5) becomes
P
d
S(~u) =
∑
i
P(Si|S)P i,dS (~u). (12)
Let (θi, φi) be the spherical coordinates of the point of the detection sphere
which correspond to the microstate Si when the polar axis is chosen parallel
to ~v. Let us reason as in Sec. 3, yet assuming that the probability that the
elastic in the detection sphere breaks at some arbitrary point is not the same
for every point, but is described by a probability distribution depending on
γ. Hence, we put
P
i,d
S (~u) = p(γ, θi), (13)
whence
P
d
S(~u) =
∑
i
P(Si|S)p(γ, θi). (14)
The conditional probabilities P(Si|S) are not predetermined and it is pos-
sible to make assumptions on them. For example, by considering the con-
tinuum limit, we can substitute Si with S(θ, φ) and introduce the following
assumptions, based on symmetry arguments.
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(i) The conditional probability density is independent of the spherical
coordinate φ, hence P(Si|S) −→ P(S(θ, φ)|S) = f(θ).
(ii) Only the hidden states belonging to the surface of a spherical cap C
centered in P have a conditional probability density f(θ) different from 0,
and the limit angle θ0 of the cap depends on the vector ~v, hence we write
θ0 = θ0(~v).
Because of the above assumptions, the probability PdS(~u) is given by
P
d
S(~u) =
∫ 2π
0
dφ
∫ π
θ0(~v)
f(θ)p(γ, θ) sin θdθ. (15)
One can make the model more specific by adding suitable assumptions
on p(γ, θ) and f(θ). In any case, if we require that the particle has to be in
a definite state, f(θ) must be such that
∫
C
f(θ)dσ =
∫ 2π
0
dφ
∫ π
θ0(~v)
f(θ) sin θdθ = 1. (16)
Let us consider now eq. (4) and the two possibilities (i) F = (~u, o1) and
(ii) F = (~u, o2). It is apparent that in case (i) PS(F ) coincides with the
probability µ(~u,~v, o1) in eq. (7), while in case (ii) it coincides with µ(~u,~v, o2)
in eq. (8). Hence, we get
P
t
S
(
(~u, o1)
)
= PdS(~u)µ(~u,~v, o1) = P
d
S(~u) cos
2 γ
2
, (17)
P
t
S
(
(~u, o2)
)
= PdS(~u)µ(~u,~v, o2) = P
d
S(~u) sin
2 γ
2
. (18)
In order to complete the model from an SR viewpoint, we must still
point out two properties f+ and f− of the classical point particle which
correspond to (~u, o1) and (~u, o2), respectively, and state a criterion for estab-
lishing whether f+ or f− is possessed by the particle in a given hidden state
Si. This can be done as follows. Firstly, partition the spherical cap C consid-
ered above into a inner spherical cap C+ centered in P and an outer spherical
crown C−. Then assume that
∫
C+
f(θ)dσ = cos2 γ
2
and
∫
C
−
f(θ)dσ = sin2 γ
2
.
Finally, assume that a particle in a hidden state belonging to C+ (C−) pro-
duces a breakdown of the elastic in the segment L1 (L2) of Fig. 3, hence
outcome o1 (o2). The properties f+ and f− are then characterized by the set
of hidden states in C+ and C−, respectively, and the factors cos
2 γ
2
and sin2 γ
2
in eqs. (17) and (18), respectively, are explained in terms of microstates.
The construction of our unified model is thus concluded. However, this
opens a new problem. Indeed, the new model is a macroscopic version of the
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microscopic SR model, which we classified as noncontextual at the beginning
of this section. One may then wonder how it was possible to embody in it
the quantum machine, which provides a model which was classified instead
as highly contextual by the authors themselves. The answer to this question
is not trivial, and requires a brief preliminary analysis of the concept of
contextuality.
According to a standard viewpoint, a physical theory is contextual when-
ever the value of an observableA in a given state of a physical system depends
on the set of (compatible) measurements that are simultaneously performed
on the system [22]. We call this kind of contextuality here contextuality1,
and note that no reference is made in its definition to individual differences
between apparatuses measuring A, which are thus implicitly considered ideal
and identical. On the contrary, according to the GB approach the contex-
tuality of the quantum machine follows from the fact that each individual
experiment introduces a different set of hidden variables of the measuring
apparatus, so that different measurements of the same observable may yield
different results [9]. This provides implicitly a different definition of contextu-
ality, that we call here contextuality2, which makes reference to the differences
that unavoidably exist between individual apparatuses measuring A.
Let us come now to the microscopic SR model and to the quantum ma-
chine. The former can be classified as noncontextual when contextuality1
is understood (indeed, the result of a measurement depends only on the
microscopic properties possessed by the physical object that one is consider-
ing, that is, on the microscopic state Si of the object)2. If, on the contrary,
contextuality2 is understood and the detection probability P
i,d
S (F ) in eq. (5)
is interpreted as expressing lack of knowledge on the interaction between the
measurement and the physical object, the microscopic SR model can be clas-
sified as contextual (but also this kind of contextuality disappears if the SR
model is deterministic). Analogously, it is apparent that the measurements
on the quantum machine are noncontextual if contextuality1 is understood
(indeed, measurements with the elastic strip in different directions are never
compatible). On the contrary, they are highly contextual, as stated in the
GB approach, if contextuality2 is understood. Our problem above is thus
solved.
It is still interesting to observe that our unified model reduces in some
2We remind that the price for noncontextuality1 of the microscopic SR model is ac-
cepting that the laws of QM cannot be applied to those physical situations that are unac-
cessible, in principle, to empirical control [12]–[15]. Such situations actually occur in QM
because of the existence of incompatible observables. We stress that this feature of the SR
model allows one to avoid a number of paradoxes without conflicting with the theoretical
description and the predictions of QM (which refer to detected physical objects only).
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sense the contextuality2 of the measurements on the quantum machine be-
cause of the final part of our construction above. Indeed, it is apparent that
the unknown features of an experiment on the quantum machine (the point
in which the elastic breaks), which affect the result of the measurement, are
explained within our unified model in terms of the hidden states Si, hence
only the contextuality2 following from the unknown probability of the a0
outcome is left in the model.
It remains to “close the circle” by showing that the above macroscopic
model mimics a spin measurement of a spin–1
2
quantum particle according
to the microscopic SR model. To this end, let us consider the observable
A represented by the operator A = 1
2
~~σ · ~u in standard QM (Sec. 3). Ac-
cording to the microscopic SR model, this observable must actually contain
in its spectrum, besides the values +1
2
~ and −1
2
~, a further value a0 that is
considered as the outcome of a measurement when the physical object is not
detected, hence it must be substituted by an observable A0 (we remind that
the lack of detection is not interpreted as an inefficiency of the measuring
apparatus, but as a consequence of the microscopic properties of the mea-
sured object, see Sec. 2). Let PAψ (+
1
2
~) and PAψ (−
1
2
~) be the probabilities
of finding the outcomes +1
2
~ and −1
2
~, respectively, in a measurement of the
observable A0 on a quantum particle in the state represented by the vector
|ψ〉 in eq. (9). By setting (i) F = (A0, {+
~
2
}) and (ii) F = (A0, {−
~
2
}), these
probabilities particularize in two different cases the probability P tS(F ) in eq.
(4). Both in (i) and (ii) the measurement of F is performed by measuring
A0, hence the detection probability P
d
S(F ) that appears in (4) is the same
in both cases and we briefly denote it by Pdψ(A). Finally, PS(F ) in eq. (4)
obviously coincides with PA,QMψ (+
1
2
~) (see eq. (10)) in case (i) and with
P
A,QM
ψ (−
1
2
~) (see eq. (11)) in case (ii). Thus, we get from eq. (4),
P
A
ψ (+
1
2
~) = Pdψ(A)P
A,QM
ψ (+
1
2
~) = Pdψ(A)cos
2γ
2
, (19)
P
A
ψ (−
1
2
~) = Pdψ(A)P
A,QM
ψ (−
1
2
~) = Pdψ(A)sin
2γ
2
. (20)
These equations coincide with eqs. (17) and (18), respectively, if one puts
Pdψ(A) = P
d
S(~u).
We would like to stress that our unified model aims to provide a macro-
scopic analogue of a quantum measurement, but does not claim in any way
to explain what actually occurs at a microscopic level. Nevertheless, the un-
specified factor PdS(~u) reminds us that, according to the SR interpretation,
QM is an incomplete theory which could be embedded, at least in principle,
into a broader theory (which is excluded by the standard interpretation).
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4.2 Description of the model for mixed states
The unified model proposed in the previous section can be generalized to
the case of nonpure (mixed) states or mixtures. Let us shortly describe this
generalization.
Let us broaden the set of states of the quantum machine by adding the
inner points of the Aerts sphere to the points on the surface as possible
locations of the classical point particle. Then, let us note that the state D
characterized by the vector ~w such that |~w| < 1 can be written as a convex
combination of the vectors ~v = ~w
|~w|
and −~v = − ~w
|~w|
representing the pure
states S1 and S2, respectively. Indeed, ~w = λ1~v + λ2(−~v), with λ1 =
1+|~w|
2
and λ2 =
1−|~w|
2
(hence 0 ≤ λ1, λ2 ≤ 1 and λ1 + λ2 = 1). If we then perform
a measurement of the kind considered in Sec. 3 whenever the quantum
machine is in the state D (see Fig. 3 with ~w in place of ~v), the probabilities
of obtaining outcomes o1 or o2 are given by
µ(~u, ~w, o1) =
L1
2
=
1 + |~w| cos γ
2
= λ1 cos
2 γ
2
+ λ2 sin
2 γ
2
, (21)
and
µ(~u, ~w, o2) =
L2
2
=
1− |~w| cos γ
2
= λ1 sin
2 γ
2
+ λ2 cos
2 γ
2
, (22)
respectively.
Let us now remind that not only pure states, but also mixed states of
spin–1
2
quantum particles can be represented on the Bloch sphere. In fact,
a mixed state represented in standard QM by the density operator W =
λ1|ψ1〉〈ψ1|+ λ2|ψ2〉〈ψ2| (where |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 are normalized and orthogonal
vectors in the Hilbert space of the system, 0 ≤ λ1, λ2 ≤ 1, λ1 + λ2 = 1)
corresponds to the inner point of the Bloch sphere characterized by the vector
~w = λ1~v+λ2(−~v) (where ~v and −~v are the vectors corresponding to |ψ1〉 and
|ψ2〉, respectively, in the Bloch representation discussed in Sec. 3), with |~w| =
|λ1 − λ2|. It is then immediate to see that the probabilities P
A,QM
W (+
1
2
~)
and PA,QMW (−
1
2
~) predicted by QM for a spin measurement in direction ~u
on a spin–1
2
quantum particle in the state represented by W coincide with
the probabilities in eqs. (21) and (22), respectively. Hence, the quantum
machine provides a macroscopic model for this kind of measurements also in
the case of mixed states. It must be stressed, however, that, according to
Aerts, D is not interpreted as a mixed state of the quantum machine, which
is highly relevant in Aerts’ perspective [7].
Let us evaluate the probabilities P tD
(
(~u, o1)
)
and P tD
(
(~u, o2)
)
of finding
the outcomes o1 and o2, respectively, in a measurement of the kind described
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Fig. 5. Representation of the detection and the quantum measurement for
a mixed state in the plane where they take place.
in Sec. 4.1 whenever the quantum machine is in the state D within our
unified model. If we consider (contrary to Aerts) the state D as a mixture
of the states S1 and S2, the coefficients λ1 and λ2 can be interpreted as the
probabilities that the quantum machine in the state D is actually in the state
S1 or in the state S2, respectively. Hence, we get
P
t
D
(
(~u, o1)
)
= λ1P
t
S1
(
(~u, o1)
)
+ λ2P
t
S2
(
(~u, o1)
)
, (23)
P
t
D
(
(~u, o2)
)
= λ1P
t
S1
(
(~u, o2)
)
+ λ2P
t
S2
(
(~u, o2)
)
. (24)
The probabilities P tS1
(
(~u, o1)
)
, P tS2
(
(~u, o2)
)
, etc., can be calculated by us-
ing eqs. (17) and (18). One gets, with γ1 and γ2 as in Fig. 5, P
t
S1
(
(~u, o1)
)
=
PdS1(~u) cos
2 γ1
2
, P tS2
(
(~u, o1)
)
= PdS2(~u) cos
2 γ2
2
, etc. Since, now, S1 and
S2 are represented by the opposite vectors ~v and −~v, respectively, and
γ2 = π−γ1, the symmetries of the particular physical system at issue suggest
to assume that PdS1(~u) = P
d
S2
(~u). By setting PdS1(~u) = P
d
S2
(~u) = PdD(~u)
and γ1 = γ, we get
P
t
D
(
(~u, o1)
)
= PdD(~u)(λ1 cos
2 γ
2
+ λ2 sin
2 γ
2
), (25)
P
t
D
(
(~u, o2)
)
= PdD(~u)(λ1 sin
2 γ
2
+ λ2 cos
2 γ
2
). (26)
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Proceeding as in Sec. 4.1, the above probabilities can then be identified with
the probabilities PAW (+
1
2
~) and PAW (−
1
2
~), respectively, that a measurement
of the observable A0 on a spin–
1
2
quantum particle in the state represented by
W yields outcome +1
2
~ and −1
2
~, respectively, according to the microscopic
SR model.
Our unified model has thus been generalized to the case of mixtures,
as desired. It must be stressed, however, that this has been done at the
expense of betraying Aerts’ original idea of not considering the state D of
the quantum machine as a mixture.
5 Conclusions
The construction in Sec. 4 shows that Aerts’ quantum machine can be used
as a basis for producing a more complex model for quantum measurements
on spin–1
2
particles. The new model constitutes a macroscopic version of
the microscopic model for quantum measurements introduced within the SR
interpretation, hence it establishes a first formal link between the GB ap-
proach and the SR interpretation of QM. Moreover, some relevant differences
between the two approaches, which seemingly make them incompatible, are
bypassed in the model. This suggests that they can be bypassed in gen-
eral by using similar procedures, even if some difficulties could arise when
considering models for quantum systems described by Hilbert spaces whose
dimension is greater that 2. In any case, the model presented in this paper
may serve as an intuitive basis for the attempt at linking together the GB
approach and the SR intepretation, aiming to construct a broader theory
going beyond the present limits of QM.
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